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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
has not hesitated to reexamine past decisions according the Four-
teenth Amendment a less central role in the preservation of basic
liberties than that which was contemplated by its Framers when
they added the Amendment to our constitutional scheme."50 Pointer
and Douglas represent continuance of this reexamination by a ma-
jority of the Court. As the Court moves away from the "concept of
ordered liberty," Mr. Justice Goldberg's comment is representative:
"[T~o deny to the States the power to impair a fundamental consti-
tutional right is not to increase federal power, but, rather, to limit
the power of both federal and state governments in favor of safe-
guarding the fundamental rights and liberties of the individual."51
Confrontation, under these decisions becomes a right, applicable
in every case, not solely in those cases where it seems "fair" to a
majority of the Court. The uniformity alone achieved by the ap-
plication of the confrontation clause to the states seems to justify
the Court's shift in constitutional theory in this area.
PiILIP L. KELLOGG
Federal Jurisdiction-Erie Doctrine-Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure
Hanna v. Plumer' involved personal injury claims arising out
of an automobile accident which was allegedly caused by the negli-
gence of a deceased Massachusetts citizen. The petitioner, a citizen
of Ohio, instituted the suit against the decedent's executor, also a
Massachusetts citizen, in the District Court for the District of
Massachusetts on the ground of diversity of citizenship. Process
was served by leaving copies of the summons and complaint with
the respondent's wife at his home. This form of service was suffi-
cient to comply with rule 4(d) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ;2 however, a special Massachusetts statute required com-
I9 Id. at 5.
"' 380 U.S. at 414.
'-380 U.S. 460 (1965).
'FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (1). This rule provides that service shall be
made in the following manner:
Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person,
by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him per-
sonally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place




mencement of the action and service in hand within one year after
an executor or administrator posted bond.3 Petitioner's complaint
was filed, and service was made less than a month before the ex-
piration of this period. Since the limitation period had lapsed when
the action came before the district court,4 litigation could continue
only if the federal rule prevailed; if the state rule was applied, the
respondent would succeed because of the insufficiency of service
within the time limited. The district court, in considering re-
spondent's motion for summary judgment, applied the state rule
on the basis of Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.5
and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.' The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit found that the conflict between the federal and the
state rules involved a substantive matter and affirmed.' The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari' "because of the threat to the goal
of uniformity of federal procedure posed by the decisions be-
low . . .-
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, stated the
issue as follows:
The question to be decided is whether, in a civil action where
jurisdiction of the United States District Court is based upon
diversity of citizenship between the parties, service of process
shall be made in the manner prescribed by state law or that set
forth in Rule 4(d) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.10
' MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 197, § 9 (1958). This section provides that
Except as provided in this chapter, an executor or administrator shall
not be held to answer to an action by a creditor of the deceased which
is not commenced within one year from the time of his giving bond
for the performance of his trust, or to such an action which is com-
menced within said year unless before the expiration thereof the writ in
such action has been served by delivery in hand upon such executor or
administrator....
'Respondent posted bond on March 1, 1962. The complaint was filed
on February 6, 1963, and the service was made two days later. The answer
was filed on February 26, 1963. 331 F.2d 157, 159 (1st Cir. 1964). The
court of appeals stated that "at the time the answer was filed it was in fact
still possible to comply with the statute. However, plaintiff took no
further action." Ibid.
337 U.S. 530 (1949).
'326 U.S. 99 (1945).
'Hanna v. Plumer, 331 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1964).8 Hanna v. Plumer, 379 U.S. 813 (1964).
'Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463 (1965). See, e.g., Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Charneski, 286 F.2d 238 (7th Cir. 1960); Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph
Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960); Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281
F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960); Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959).
10380 U.S. 460, 461 (1965).
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In response to this issue the Court said:
We conclude that the adoption of Rule 4(d) (1), designed to
control service of process in diversity actions, neither exceeded
the congressional mandate embodied in the Rules Enabling Act
nor transgressed constitutional bounds, and that the Rule is
therefore the standard against which the District Court should
have measured the adequacy of service. Accordingly, we reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals.'1
The issue raised by this case had its genesis in section 34 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provides that "the laws of the
several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes
of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the Courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply."' 2 In the monumental
decision of Swift v. Tyson, 3 decided in 1842, the Supreme Court
held the term "laws" to mean state statutes and their construction,
local usages, and decisions as to real estate. The result was that in
diversity cases not involving one of these three categories, the fed-
eral courts could apply a federal "common law."' 4 The Conformity
Act of 1872's required the federal district courts to follow the pro-
cedure regulating similar actions in the forum state.'0 Thus, in
summary, "prior to 1938 the pattern in federal courts had been con-
formity to state law on matters of procedure, under the Conformity
Act, but substantial uniformity among the federal courts on sub-
stantive law under the aegis of Swift v. Tyson."' 7
In 1938, two events occurred which in effect reversed the situa-
tion described above. First, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to the Rules
"
1Id. at 463-64. In a footnote to the opinion, the Court noted that
"there are a number of state service requirements which would not necessarily
be satisfied by compliance with Rule 4(d) (1)." North Carolina was listed
as falling in this category. Id. at 463 n.2. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-94(1953).
' 1 STAT. 92 (1789) (now 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958)).1841 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs § 54, at 188 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
WRIGHT].
"
5Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, 17 STAT. 197.
" This state of affairs proved to be impracticable because some states
were far ahead of others in procedural reform. See Smith, Blue-Ridge and
Beyond: A Byrd's-Eye View of Federalisn in Diversity Litigation, 36
TUL. L. REV. 443 (1962).
17 WRIGHT § 59, at 209.
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Enabling Act. 8 The purpose of the federal rules was to establish
uniformity of procedure in the federal courts.19 Second, the Su-
preme Court, in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,2" overruled Swift v. Tyson.
In his opinion for the Court, Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or
by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law
of the state. And whether the law of the state shall be declared
by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision
is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general
common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules
of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in
their nature or "general," be they commercial law or a part of
the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to
confer such a power upon the federal courts. 2'
The policy underlying the Erie decision was the desire for
intrastate uniformity in result regardless of whether the action was
brought in state or federal court.2 Since this uniformity pertained
to substantive law, the distinction between substance and procedure
became a central issue. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 23 demonstrated
that the traditional distinctions between substance and procedure
had been encroached upon by the policy of uniformity.24 There, a
group of noteholders brought a class action against Guaranty Trust
Co., the trustee under the indenture. The issue was whether a state
statute of limitations that would have barred the action in a state
forum also functioned as a limitation in the federal court. The
Court held that the state statute of limitations significantly affected
the outcome of the litigation and therefore must be applied. An
"outcome-determinative" test was set forth, the essence of which
was that if the determination of an issue would have a decisive in-
fluence on the outcome of the case, then that issue was one of "sub-
stance.
'25
18 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958). This act provides that "the Supreme Court
shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules . . . the practice and
procedure of the district courts of the United States . .. in civil actions.
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right .... "
1" See, Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play on the Federal
Rides, 3 VAND. L. REV. 711 (1950); Smith, supra note 16.
20304 U.S. 64 (1938). This decision was handed down five months
before the federal rules were to become effective.
'
111d. at 78.
22 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
"Ibid.
24 See 26 N.C.L. REV. 60 (1947).
2" See I BARRON & HoLTzoFF § 138 (Wright ed. 1960); 28 U. CINc. L.
REv. 390 (1959).
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Although the outcome-determinative test was heavily criticized,
it was applied by the Court until 1958.26 The major criticism was
that there was no apparent stopping place.2 Professor Charles A.
Wright asserts that three of the cases28 in which the test was applied
"showed the deference to state law which was to be required in
matters which, for other purposes, are clearly procedural."29
In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., ° decided in f958,
the "outcome-determinative" test was modified. The case involved
a state rule providing that a court rather than a jury should de-
termine whether a corporation was a statutory employer for purposes
of the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act. The federal
policy was that the jury should decide the issue."' The Court laid
down a twofold rule for determining whether a state rule should
be applied in a diversity case: If the rights and obligations of the
parties are defined by state law, then the state law is applicable, but
where the significance of the state law lies in "form and mode,"3'
an investigation of the policies supporting the state and federal
rules is appropriate. The stronger policy should control even though
there may be a question of variance in outcome.m Thus, the second
part of the rule involves a balancing process.
In applying the rule to the facts of the case, the Court first de-
cided that the state rule involved only "form and mode." It then
applied the balancing process to the respective rules and concluded
that the federal policy of having a jury determine the question was
' Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956);
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Woods v.
Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S.
183(1947).Hart, The Relations between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUm. L. R!v.
489 (1954); Clark, Federal Procedural Reform and States' Rights; to a
More Perfect Union, 40 TEXAs L. REv. 211 (1961).
"Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949);
Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
"WRIGHT, § 59, at 208.
80356 U.S. 525 (1958).
"1 The Court used the term "policy" in stating the issue:
Thus the inquiry here is whether the federal policy favoring jury de-
cisions of disputed fact questions should yield to the state rule in the
interest of furthering the objective that the litigation should not come
out one way in the federal court and another way in the state court
Id. at 538.
"I d. at 536.
"Smith, supra note 16.
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the most cogent because of the seventh amendment. The result was
that a federal policy supported by the seventh amendment prevailed
over a simple "outcome-determinative" test. It would seem that the
Court, in applying the second aspect of the rule, does not preclude the
possibility that a state rule might prevail even in the area of pro-
cedure.
4
In Hanna85 the respondent contended that Erie and York made
it mandatory for the federal court to apply state law governing
service of process rather than rule 4(d) (1). However, the Court
held that where there is a federal rule and a state rule which are in
direct conflict, the federal rule will prevail if it is constitutionally
valid and if it meets the requirements of the Rules Enabling Act.8"
The Court concluded that rule 4(d) (1) was within the bounds of
the Constitution and that, on the basis of Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,a
it did not violate the Rules Enabling Act.
What is the law under the Erie doctrine today? Erie was said
to have a constitutional basis; yet Mr. Justice Brandeis failed to
designate a specific section of the Constitution. This point alone has
excited a great deal of comment."8 The issue of whether Congress
and the federal courts can declare the substantive rules of common
law applicable in a state has not been specifically considered since
Erie; however, it was referred to in one case. 9 Though Hanna
does not answer the constitutional issue, it does tend to abolish any
doubts concerning the constitutional validity of rules governing
procedure in federal courts.
[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court system (aug-
mented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it
congressional power to make rules governing the practice and
pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power to regu-
late matters which, though falling within the uncertain area be-
tween substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classifi-
cation as either.40
*' 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 560 (1961).
85380 U.S. 460 (1965).
so 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958), supra note 18.
'312 U.S. 1 (1941). The Court in this case defined procedure as
"the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by sub-
stantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or
infraction of them." Id. at 14.
8 See WRIGHT § 56.
" Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956). Here,
the Court specifically stated that they were avoiding the issue.40380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). (Emphasis added.)
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Hanna has seemingly clarified application of the Erie doctrine
in three situations. First, where there is a direct conflict between a
federal rule and a state rule, the federal rule will prevail if it is
constitutionally valid and does not exceed the limitations established
by the Rules Enabling Act.
Secondly, Hanna appears not to preclude future application of
the "outcome-determinative" test in a certain class of cases. In
Hanna, the difference between the Massachusetts rule and the fed-
eral rule would be "outcome-determinative" in the sense that either
respondent would win because of insufficient service within the one-
year limitation or the case would continue, but this is not the "out-
come-determinative" sense in which the test is usually applied. The
Court stated that it would be "outcome-determinative" if the plain-
tiff, in choosing whether to bring suit in federal or state court,
faced a total bar to recovery due to the applicable rule in the state
court. The Court was not confronted with this situation in Hanna
because the special state statute of limitations had not run against
the petitioner when the action was commenced and thus there was
a choice of forum.
4
'
The question remains as to when the test is still applicable. The
answer would seem to lie in the Court's reference to a series of
cases where a state rule was enforced though it was argued that a
federal rule governed. In the words of the Court, "the scope of
the Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing party urged, and
therefore, there being no Federal Rule which covered the point in
dispute, Erie commanded the enforcement of state law." ' Two
cases are illustrative of this situation. In Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co.,43 a state statute required the issue of
summons in addition to the filing of the complaint to toll the statute
of limitations. Federal rule 3 provided that the action was commenced
with the filing of the complaint. The statute of limitations had run
after the complaint was filed in the federal district court but prior
to the service of summons. The Court held that the state statute
was applicable and the claim barred. In Cohen v. Beneficial In-
distrial Loan Corp.,44 a state rule which went one step further than
"Id. at 469.
"Id. at 470.
"337 U.S. 530 (1949).
"337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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federal rule 23(b)45 by requiring the posting of bond by the plain-
tiff in a shareholder's derivative suit was applied rather than rule
23(b).
Ragan and Cohen would clearly seem to be "outcome-determina-
tive" test cases in the very sense the Court spoke of such a test in
Hanna. In both cases there is a federal rule that is not as broad as
the state rule, but does not conflict with it. Thus, the conclusion
would seem to be that when there is a federal rule and a state rule
which do not conflict, but the plaintiff may be barred in the state
court because the state rule goes one step further, the "outcome-
determinative" test is still appropriate and the state law should
prevail.
Thirdly, the Court in Hanna made the following statement:
[i]t is doubtful that, even if there were no Federal Rule
making it clear that in hand service is not required in diversity
actions, the Erie rule would have obligated the District Court
to follow the Massachusetts procedure. 'Outcome-determination'
analysis was never intended to serve as a talisman.46
Here, the Court, citing Byrd, seemingly indicated that the Byrd
balance test might still be applied where an established federal
practice not specifically required by the federal rules conflicts with
state procedure. Byrd involved a situation in which there was a
general federal policy favoring jury trials and a contrary state rule
specifically designed to meet the very fact situation before the
Court. It is important to remember that in Byrd, unlike in Hanna,
there was no federal rule that was specifically and directly contrary
to the state rule.48  Thus, it seems fair to conclude that when a
problem involves a federal practice that is not specifically contrary
to the state rule, but conflicts with it, the Court will apply the balance
test of Byrd with the most cogent in terms of policy prevailing.
" Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) provides that the plaintiff in a shareholder's
derivative suit shall aver (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the
time of the wrong or that he got his shares by operation of law and (2)
that the action is not collusive. The complaint must also show a demand
for action upon the directors, and if necessary, the shareholders. If no
demand is shown, reasons must be given for this.
,380 U.S. 460, 466-67 (1965).
"The state rule specifically applied to a worknen's compensation issue.
""The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment
to the Constitution or as given by statute of the United States shall be
preserved to the parties inviolate." Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(a). This rule is not
mentioned in the majority opinion of Byrd.
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As demonstrated by Byrd, if the federal practice has a strong federal
or constitutional basis, it is likely to prevail. 9
In summary, it would seem that Hanna is indicative of the
Court's respect for the federal rules which it promulgated. For
example, in the strict Hanna situation the federal rule prevails, and
in the "outcome-determinative" class of cases there is no disrespect
to the Federal Rules because there is no conflict. The balance test
is also illustrative of the Court's respect for a uniform system of
federal procedure. If the federal practice is not applied in a par-
ticular situation, it is only because the practice is not as essential
to the maintenance of uniformity in federal procedure as the state
rule is to the policy of intrastate uniformity in result.
JAMES L. NELSON
Federal Jurisdiction-Labor Law-Jurisdiction to Remove Suits to
Enjoin Strikes to Federal Court
In American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Marine Div., Int'l.
Union Operating Eng'rs1 the defendant union had ceased work,
and the plaintiff, there being a no-strike clause in their contract,
sought to enjoin the strike by a suit in the Pennsylvania state court.
The defendant removed to federal court under section 1441 (b) of
the Judicial Code.2 Plaintiff moved to remand under section 1447(c)
of the Judicial Code.- The district court denied the motion,4 holding
that it had jurisdiction under section 301 (a) of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947r and that the case was, therefore, prop-
" Smith, supra note 16.
'338 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 985 (1965),
reversing 224 F. Supp. 985 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
S(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original juris-
diction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties
or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the
citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be
removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and
served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is
brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1958).
"If at any time before final judgement it appears that the case was
removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall
remand the case . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
'224 F. Supp. 985, 989 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting com-
merce . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States
[Vol. 44
